Picking Winners

History is constructed by scribes and liars

The Crystal Palace

Liberal Democracy in the postmodern world is wholly reliant upon networked deceit. It is not so much a house of cards but a champagne flute pyramid of the most delicate crystal mythology that gets all of its heft and splendor from the way light filters through the bubbly, liquid lies filling each fragile chalice. We lie to ourselves in the mirror, we lie to our loved ones over breakfast, we sing along to lies on our way to fake jobs, we discuss fixed sports games and poorly constructed fictions around a water cooler filled with liquid of misrepresented purity. We take in a pile of fabrications from news radio on the way home to hear about the lies teachers tell our children. We fall asleep thinking about the day’s particular misdirections and misinformations, and we dream of worlds that do not or cannot exist.

We are doused in deceit. Political and cultural identity is dictated by which lie stack we prefer. The very concept of truth itself has been broken into shards and hidden away in various categories of wrongthink or political incorrectness.

Form fits function.

It is not my position that republics require deceit to function by design, but it is unfailingly the case that every form of liberal democracy in history has relied on this same method of structural deceit.

The truth is hard to configure at will or whim. It resists shaping and rejiggering. Because of its nature, it cannot be easily ignored or discounted when appropriate, relevant, or recognized. Given the choice, people most often prefer pretty lies to ugly truths, and because this is axiomatic, it means that liars eventually win out over the honest when it comes to group decisions.

Integral to this meta-mechanism is the entity we refer to as mainstream media (MSM). For entirely logical legal reasons, every news program is technically an entertainment product. Nothing in our system rewards honesty. If you own up to your mistakes, you lose; if you lie, cheat, and steal, you win. If you absolve yourself of responsibility, you get to blame poverty or racism or discrimination. If you pretend to lack cognitive capacity, you avoid legal consequences.

Innocent by reason of insanity; Jesus wept

This situation was borne of the progression of the latter half of the 20th century. It is not that there were no lies before World War 02, it’s just that the prosecution of that war in particular taught the elite that lying is cheaper, faster, and more effective within the confines of the artifice of democracy. There’s a lot that could be said about Hitler and Holocaustianity here. As the nations of the world all migrated toward some form of liberal democracy, these mechanics proliferated downward and outward. This mass transmogrification did not occur overnight, but it did happen right before our very eyes, and because of the previously stated internal dynamics, both we and our ancestors consistently chose pretty lies over bitter truths.

The pernicious ubiquity of this modular, scalable, and commoditized deceit means that there is no end of examples to choose from. Possibly my “favorite” is the idea that America lost the Vietnam War. I think this is a loadbearing lie in the postmodern construct.

The America Lost Vietnam deceit construct is so vast, so lovingly and elaborately constructed, that even the most clear-eyed, patriotic man takes it as a given that we lost. No multi-hour documentary is required to refute this lie. You can figure it out in about 20 minutes of reviewing the actual data and keeping a dictionary handy to make sure you are ascribing the appropriate definition to the terms. By every relevant measure, the United States won the Vietnam War, all save one: the consensus of common knowledge.

The widely held belief that America Lost Vietnam is predicated on a comparatively smaller and more easily exposed lie: that the Tet Offensive was a communist victory. This belief is the result of a clumsy but effective psyop that programmed the American people, grooming the minds of commoners and elites alike to swallow blatant lies and ignore banal but observable truths.

“Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of America, not in the battle fields of Vietnam.”¹

The Facts of the Matter

Not only did the Republic of South Vietnam and its ally the United States win the battle of the Tet Offensive, the NLF was broken and the NVA was gutted, leading to them capitulating during truce talks a few short years later. The obvious truth, backed up by mountains of facts & data, is that the communist North lost the Vietnam War. Even now, I can sense you shaking your head skeptically or derisively. When you think about how powerful the fourth estate is, never forget that you yourself remain convinced that we lost, despite all evidence to the contrary.

In the years leading up to the Tet Offensive, the MACV (Military Assistance Command - Vietnam) had been running a brutal and relentless seek & destroy campaign against the NLF (the National Liberation Front)² that had more or less knocked them out of the war. Because the NLF couldn’t hit Americans or the forces of Saigon effectively, they began going after softer, civilian targets. In current era, we refer to this as “terrorism,” which is defined as violence to persons or damage to property with the goal of influencing or coercing political positions, opinions, actions, or processes. At the time, it was considered martial desperation.

In the spring of 1967, Operation Junction City deployed 20,000 allied troops, both US (United States) and ARVN (Army of the Republic of VietNam), in a coordinated operation with massive ground and air support that wiped out 2,700 troops of the NLF and NVA (North Vietnamese Army - commie dinks, to employ the vernacular). This was the biggest operation, but it was not the only one, and it served as the culmination of a years long campaign that was working. There were follow-up successes entrained with Junction City, stacking bodies and taking so much territory that upwards of 80% of South Vietnam was categorically pacified by the summer of 1967.

This was a high point of the Vietnam Police Action³, and the beginning of total defeat for the NLF. Much of the tenacity and capacity of the communists in the south was predicated on complex and persistent networks of position, supply, and support. These had been built up over the two decades of fighting first the Japanese and then the French. Much of it was shattered, to the point that desertion was the main threat to the communist side at this point in the war. The main headquarters of the NLF was abandoned with the surviving leaders and personnel fleeing to Cambodia. The documentary evidence is clear; the communists were losing, and if nothing changed, the war would be lost.

In the latter half of 1967, the communist leadership in Hanoi were forced to confront the fact that their political and strategic methods were failing, and a re-calibration of both intent and method was necessary. In the country of Vietnam, the propaganda shifted from the boiler plate, high-minded communist rhetoric to a more grievance based, emotional argument against the oppressors⁴. In terms of tactics, engagements with the Americans in protracted or wide scale operations were abandoned, and the focus shifted to targeted attacks with the goal of propaganda victory being primary over tactical success, in service to the foolish idea that within every yellow body was a loyal communist yearning to be put in socialist chains. So instead of going after military targets, they would target civilian infrastructure and rear echelon positions.

The idea behind this strategic shift was incredibly shrewd, and I am of the opinion that it was not wholly of Vietnamese origin. From the lofty heights of the overconnected 21st century, we now know without any doubt that the meta-network of cultural communism was global in scope. Vietnamese communists prioritizing the televisibility of attacks makes no sense for a population that was largely rural and not electrified. This strategy was pointed directly at the American populace, and I believe it was constructed, in part or whole, in Moscow, New York City, and Los Angeles, then handed to Hanoi.

At this time, MSM in America was lousy with commies, but it was still intellectually and ideologically diverse, wildly so compared to our current era. At no point during the war were there ever any changes to the bleating and shrieking of the pacifist class, a relatively small but widespread and influential group wholly suborned to International Communism. Simply put, there was no group, organization, or association who made peace their point or purpose that was not in some way connected to, affiliated with, or manipulated by the shadow propaganda network constructed by the KGB and their American partners.

Likewise, McCarthy’s catastrophic failure in taking on the American Red Menace meant that CIA (Cuckolds In Arms), the State Department, and even the DOD (Dullards Overseeing Disaster) were infested with communist cells and sympathizers. The point is that there were endless opportunities for the cultural communist meta-network to observe inputs, outputs, and effects in the realms of both policy and process. Global Communism was very aware of what worked on the American people, and I just cannot fathom having an interpretation of events that doesn’t take this into account.

So, the big question is, if America and their South Vietnamese partners were doing so well, why is it that every popular recollection of this war is a noxious mix of conscripted peasants dying in droves, poorly formulated strategy, a lack of commitment to the conflict, and a general tenor of defeat, retreat, and loss?

The myth of the Vietnam War is a towering tribute to the power of the leftist infotainment complex over the hearts and minds of Americans. For every The Green Berets (1968), there are ten Platoons (1986). You can find literally thousands of interviews of so-called Vietnam War “vets” sharing elaborate, gory, and, in the final analysis, contrived recollections of mass war crimes, unwarranted brutality, and pointless killing⁵. When you read the phrase “'Nam Vet,” you instantly conjure the image of a sad, broken man carrying massive invisible burdens with which he was unfairly saddled. When forgettable stand up comedians want to mock and deride the US military, they pretend a pack of canny jungle Asians defeated the American army in battle.

Almost universally absent from the mythology suite of Vietnam War era media is the ARVN, the military forces of South Vietnam. When they are mentioned, they are related as bumbling, incompetent, corrupt morons incapable of little more than theft, rapine, and retreat. I firmly believe that nobody makes war like the White man, and modern war trebly so. But a very close second to that is the yellow man, excluding China of course (the historical record of Chinese warfare is very clear: they have one core competency, and that is dying in unbelievably large numbers), and I urge you to ask yourself how an ethnolinguistic group divided only by an artificial line on a map could simultaneously be a group of shrewd & vicious jungle warriors AND a pack of spineless do-nothings. The truth is that the ARVN were not just equal to the NVA in terms of combat capacity, they were superior by almost every measure given the amount and quality of support they received from their allies.

Setting the Stage

The evidence clearly indicates that the summer of 1967 was a fateful for Northern Vietnamese communism. A giant secret meeting was held in approximately July⁶ to address the issues and problems, to put forth a new direction and strategy, and, most critically, to identify any weak or unwilling members of the elite layer of Vietnamese communism and dispense with them. We get a number of important results after the culmination of the meeting: a new strategy for the general war, the initial planning of the Tet Offensive, and the purge of ~200 members, officers, and agents who were deemed unfaithful, unwilling, or unnecessary.

The truth of the Tet Offensive is that it was a Hail Mary play that failed. The goal was to initiate such a massive and dynamic terrorist action that all of the latent communism within the population of the South would coalesce into a People’s Revolution, with the masses joining their NLF liberators in overthrowing Saigon and expelling the Americans. Not only did it fail to create this people’s revolution, it annihilated almost all of the communist networks and assets in the south.

“The Tet Offensive failed because we underestimated our enemies and overestimated ourselves. We set goals which we realistically could not achieve.”⁷

It’s a mistake to take the failure of the Tet Offensive and presume that it was a bad plan, poorly executed, or pointless. Obviously, in retrospect, it worked. It should not have worked, because, and I can’t stress this enough, it was a terrible defeat for the NLF, the NVA, and Vietnamese communism, but the wild card of American Media combined with the hubris falling from the sky upon American military leadership turned a complete route into eventual political victory.

The maskirovka deployed to make the Tet Offensive possible was brilliant. The NVA convinced both Saigon and the Pentagon that there was to be a week-long truce over the Tet holiday. A Tet truce been a custom for the previous 20 years of warfare, but never for this duration. Because of the success of Operation Junction City, the allied forces in the south were expecting some kind of strategic action during the projected truce, and the extended duration fed into their idea that the communists were on the back leg and in desperate need of resupply & repositioning. Additionally, the NVA inserted political agents carrying a fake message of inquiries towards a greater truce or even a mass drawdown of the conflict. Again, the powers that be in the south believed this to be expected, and when it appeared to materialize, they bought in completely. Another elegant aspect to the maskirovka was the suspicion engendered in Saigon that Hanoi was secretly negotiating directly with American military leadership for a unilateral truce that wouldn’t include the South in the negotiations.

The final piece of the grand distraction was two separate major attacks on isolated American positions near the North-South border, well away from the actual area of operation intended for the Tet Offensive. One was in the north and west, near the Cambodian border. This attack was an interesting form of live action exercise for the Tet Offensive intended to train the officers who were to participate and get them bloodied. It cost the Communist 6,000 casualties, an acceptable price to get the whole of American military leadership focused in precisely the wrong area.

The Vietnamese communists deployed every method, tactic, and asset at their disposal to occlude the coming attack while simultaneously flooding the zone with all of the men and materiel required for it to come off. The fact is that American military intelligence absolutely picked up on what was happening. But the deception was so well crafted to bamboozle the type of American in charge of military forces in the south that it didn’t matter. The intelligence officers and organizations who saw the Tet Offensive coming were powerless to convince leadership of it; the assault on Khe San was about the most elegant cover operation ever effected in modern military history. Just days before the Tet Offensive, General Westmorland, head honcho of the MACV and author of Seek & Destroy, made sure to warn all of his commanders not to be distracted from Khe San, which ran the grave risk of becoming America’s Dien Bien Phu. More on this later.

It is important to note that the CIA was split in their assessment of what was coming down the pike. Assets and officers in country, the men closest to the battlefield and putting in the actual sweat equity to the intelligence enterprise, were more or less convinced that some kind of unprecedented distributed attack was in the offing. This was not in line with the perspectives and assessments coming out of Langley⁸. Information that has recently come to light demonstrates, categorically in my opinion, that the agency was in some way compromised by embedded American Communist elements⁹. This analytical dichotomy strongly indicates that there was more going on than just the organic maskirovka being effected by Hanoi.

So, the sprawling intelligence apparatus was paralyzed due to both size and sabotage. The leadership was distracted by both cover offensives and well-poisoning that showed them exactly what they expected to see. And the forces were sliding towards incapacity based on the expectation of an extended truce. The stage was set for a powerful victory for those commie dink bastards. Unfortunately for them, they forgot two very important things: American soldiers love being surrounded, and nobody likes commie terrorists.

The Offensive

There is no denying that the Operation caught the MACV and the ARVN flat-footed. While the American military leadership was worrying about Khe San, and Saigon was preparing for a much desired breather in the form of a Tet truce, scores of thousands of communists unleashed hell across the South. One thing the American MSM consciously decided to ignore was the brutality of the attacks. Droves of civilians and noncombatants were herded into holding points, tortured, then executed; at least 5,000 in Hue alone. Families were executed together, infants were battered against walls, little girls were literally raped to death, little boys were gelded¹⁰, and anyone connected to Saigon or the ARVN was hunted down like dogs.

As communist brutality goes, it was actually quite normal. Commies are, as a rule, soulless scum devoid of empathy. But it was still barbaric in terms of scale for the geography and era. One would be forgiven for believing the Cambodian communists were squatting just over the border and taking notes; indeed, one would be correct. You must remember that seek & destroy had worked, and the South was for the most part at peace. Saigon was expecting some form of capitulation, and this message had percolated downward into the populace. When the attack started fully, it was a terrible shock to the population of the Republic of Vietnam.

Even as women, children, and elderly were being assaulted and murdered, there was already foreshadowing of the final outcome. Illiterate peasants of the NLF had misunderstood the directives coming from Hanoi and had launched multiple attacks a day or more early in certain places. As noted above, the various intelligence apparatuses in country were aware that something was in the offing, so these premature ejaculations of communist atrocity tripped the sensors of more than a few local commanders and contingents. The first day of attacks were heinous, but within hours the MACV and the ARVN were already responding. Indeed, more than a few local commanders knew which way the wind was blowing and had already cancelled the leave of their soldiery. News of the attacks spread quickly, and the footprint of the complex attack was immense, so many soldiers either rushed back to their posts or got busy doing the Lord’s work and sending proximal commies straight to hell.

In isolated positions, what we often refer to as FOBs (Forward Operating Bases), Marines and soldiers got busy teaching the yellow menace just how much fun a “fire free” environment is when you have a dedicated M-60 gunner and men who have been champing at the bit to put paid to the enemy. There were multiple instances of NVA sleepers attempting to infiltrate fortifications with stolen uniforms only to die like dogs on the bayonets of the gate guards. In other places, local commanders took the initiative and, utilizing helicopters and artillery, established murder corridors around the actual installations, smoking whole columns of of NLF and NVA as they death-marched their way to their preselected targets.

At no point, in no space or place, did the commies have the upper hand. The shock of surprise gave them the initiative for the span of a day, and the USM and ARVN extracted a staggering butcher’s bill with talmudic levels of interest on top. After two weeks, the communist losses were beyond awful, while the MACV and ARVN received little more than a pin prick in terms of actual casualties. The majority of primary sources, firsthand accounts, and ex post facto documentation demonstrate the outcome categorically: the commies planned, coordinated, and effected a brilliant distributed complex terror attack, and the Americans & their Saigon allies responded swiftly and decisively.

The Fallout

It is not remarkable to say that Western media worked through individual acts as well as collective methods to turn the heroic defense of the ARVN and USM into a perceived defeat. This was not a case of differing opinions, or a lack of inputs or information, or even blind spots predicated on geography and chronology. The Tet Offensive lasted little more than 2 weeks, and during that time 33,000 NVA and VC died, while 60,000 or more were wounded and 6,000 were captured. Not a single strategic target was held. Not one.

During the offensive, the ARVN lost 2,800 soldiers alongside 1,100 American deaths, the combined weight not even being 10% of the Communist losses. Not a single city was ever even remotely close to being taken over. The damage from the Communist assault equated to a handful of buildings being destroyed, a score or more military installations having to fend off attackers, and a fortnight of chaos and fear as the communist terrorists were mopped up. And they were mopped up, to a man. It was a remarkably successful defensive operation by the Allies in the south. Instead of a people’s revolution, the populace of South Vietnam delivered communist terrorists directly to the ARVN or local constabulary, then hung out and waited for them to get lynched or shot.

These are the facts, and yet I have no doubt that many reading this essay will be encountering them for the first time. During the attack, and in the months & years to follow, MSM deployed every pen, typewriter, camera, and telegraph at their disposal to construct an artificial narrative of widespread defeat, catastrophic ruin, and Communist victory. Field journalists would drive through miles of unspoiled cityscape to find the meager handful of damaged buildings to use as the backdrop for breathless accounts of wreck & ruin. Dramatic pictures of sobbing White women and murdered embassy guards were used as an infographic cudgel against the minds & eyes of the news consuming populace in America. Communist atrocities against noncombatants and children were categorically ignored.

“Rarely had contemporary crisis journalists veered so completely from reality.”¹¹

There were two distinct motivating factors that contributed to the construction of this edifice of deceit. The first was the ideolectual complicity of the American Reds within both media and intelligence apparatuses, as covered above. Commies lie with every breath we foolishly allow them to take, and the lens of media was an incredibly narrow gate for them to keep when it came to information coming out of Vietnam. Hand in hand with the like of that disgusting, traitorous cunt Jane Fonda, many members of the press corps both at home and abroad sided with the communists and were always looking for opportunities to support their crusade.

The second was more critical: the free thinkers, or at least less ideological and/or intellectually compromised, members of the press felt completely betrayed by the US military complex. For many months they had been fed a consistent diet of assertions and claims that the South was winning, that the North was losing, and that the conflict was in its final stages. Suddenly, the messaging pouring out seemed to show a resilient and triumphant North utterly savaging a discombobulated and weak South, making all of their previous reporting appear to be at best incorrect and at worst deceitful. Just as minorities will always inevitably side with “their own” when the situation gets dicey or unpredictable, so too will newsmen side with newsmen when the facts appear to be “up for debate.” The journos on the ground were shrieking about a staggering defeat for Saigon, the footage and photos seemed to back this up, and so the press corps decided to carry commie water and reify the message.

The incongruity between the “facts on the ground” and “the facts as reported” did not go unnoticed by everyone. While the American people and their politicians may have been completely duped, the rank & file of the military were not wholly taken in. The men on the ground saw what had happened, had personally participated in distributing dirt naps for scores of thousands of commie terrorists, and they were thunderstruck by the scale and fragility of this towering deceit. Decades hence the truth would leak out via biographies & memoirs, and the already tenuous relationship between journos and soldiers was mortally wounded by the Great Lie of the Tet Offensive.

But the damage was decisive and done. In the space of a month, America went from “winning” to “losing” in the minds of the elite classes, which inevitably led to a widespread and unified sense of defeat in the hearts of the common folk. Whoever may have escaped this psyop at the time was eventually programmed by the deluge of defeatist literature and cinema that profited so richly in the wake of the conflict. The hard truth that so many on the Greater Right have yet to internalize is that in the battle for hearts and minds, fiction beats fact every time.

Fog of War

Taking into account the full weight of losses in terms of men and materiel, the Tet Offensive is a warped and reversed echo of the most important battle of the First Indochina War: Dien Bien Phu. This was the protracted French defeat that served to be the ultimate battle in Vietnam for French colonial forces. An army of 16,000 was surrounded and besieged by a horde of more than 50,000 Vietminh soldiers. For the better part of a year, the French forces and their colonial allies held out against overwhelming numbers and punishing artillery barrages. Once their position was cut off, their only option for resupply was by air, a daunting prospect in any circumstance. Near the end of the battle, the French General Staff secretly begged the United States to drop atom bombs on the Vietminh. Unbeknownst to the French, and indeed pretty much everyone then and now, Western Europe had no greater foe than Eisenhower, the crypto progressive who deserves to be shamed then forgotten.

Of the 8,000 French that surrendered, barely 3,000 survived captivity to return to a country that didn’t want them. Dien Bien Phu was a categorical loss for French colonial forces, but just as the French national army was more than 85% intact after the German blitz through Belgium, so too were the vast majority of colonial forces in Vietnam ready, willing, and able to carry the fight to their yellow adversaries. But the myth of the defeat, and subsequent omens & portents, unmanned the French government and military leadership. French media made sure to transmute a tactical defeat into strategic failure.

There is neither tactical nor strategic comparison between Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the Tet Offensive in 1968; the Vietnamese communists were utterly defeated, the ARVN scored a sovereignty enhancing victory, and the MACV received little more than a bloody nose. The comparison comes from how public perception curated by media editorialization served to cut off the military leadership at the knees by way of political pressure. While the French would have faced an uphill battle to restore local prestige, tactical advantage, and strategic trajectory, all the Americans had to do after Tet was keep doing everything they had done leading up to it. The data is explicitly clear: the NVA and the NLF were all but finished. The Tet Offensive was the “hailest of maries” in modern war history, and it failed by every measure in both tactical and strategic terms.

And yet, they won.

MACV never recovered in terms of perception or prestige. Westmoreland was “promoted” to a stateside position. The media was now unified in their opposition to the American military apparatus, either implicitly or explicitly. Politicians would only differ in their approach to Vietnam in terms of speed of withdrawal. Every subsequent battlefield reversal would be painted as “the next Tet Offensive.” The allies in the South had mauled the FLN so badly that they had no one of substance or rank to send to the truce talks in January 1973. The Linebacker operations had so thoroughly clobbered the North that it took Ho Chi Minh’s gook squad two years to put together the semblance of an army that could roll into the South. Indeed, the only reason the commies were able to invade in 1975 is because the liberal controlled congress of the US intentionally and explicitly cut off the Republic of Vietnam from military and civil support. Hanoi was so thoroughly buggered that they had to wait for Pol Pot to eradicate a third of Cambodia before Hanoi could even dream of crossing the border to fight the Khmer Rouge in 1978, and even then they couldn’t beat them, eventually withdrawing in 1989.

The Follow Up

The Great Lie that is the popular perception of the Tet Offensive required a few key elements: a US military leadership unable or unwilling to see the battlefield through the eyes of their adversary; a well-connected, well functioning global network of communist propaganda and espionage; and an intelligence community compromised politically and distracted strategically. With these elements in place, the circumstances were set for journalists, editors, and pundits to create a narrative of defeat and run with it. The lies told by the press wing of the military set the stage for journalists to be embarrassed in their reporting, and whenever this happens, the pinko class never stops sharpening knives and looking for backs to thrust them into. What started as a media feeding frenzy on a made up story quickly became “The Real Story.”

“We fought a military war, our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition, our opponents aimed for psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their armed forces the way a bullfighter uses his red cape; to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.”¹²

The way the war is remembered is fascinating, if somewhat depressing. “Everybody knows” America lost, even though the facts of the matter are just sitting there in the pages of history. There’s always a story to be told, and how that story gets told is more important than the truth of the story itself. This lie is out and swallowed; there’s no taking it back. I only ask you use this incident as a lens by which you view other events and circumstances where “everybody knows that-” is the most common comment.

After his country was handed over to communists by a bunch of faggot democrat congress critters, General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan made his way to the States and lived in relatively quiet obscurity running a laundromat in a fascinating place called Seven Corners, where the flag of the Republic of Vietnam still proudly flies to this day.

I think the Anamese know how close they came to losing everything, and they only smile and nod with all the self-hating Americans who visit their strip of jungle, braying about our “loss.” General Loan’s people lost their country, even though they won their war.

There’s a lesson there for us.

1. Marshall McCluhan, Montreal Gazette May 1975

2. If you are the type of guy that makes a land acknowledgement before you piss in the woods, you probably call them the Viet Cong.

3. There is no real reason to try and point this out, but America was never actually at war with Vietnam.

4. American Whites should be familiar with this concept.

5. 85% of the soldiers deployed to Vietnam saw no combat whatsoever.

6. All written records were destroyed; we only know of this from personal accounts, recollections, and memoirs.

7. NVA General, 1978

8. I remind you: Langley and Foggy Bottom have always been hives of sodomites and communists.

9. I cannot encourage you enough to read this article.

10. Nowadays, you can have this done at a progressive hospital. Back then, you needed a machete and slanted eyes.

11. Peter Braestrup, 1979

12. Henry Kissinger, 1969